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The relationships between doctors and
drug companies are controversial and
have long been scrutinized by researchers,
ethicists, professional bodies, and legisla-
tors [1]. In recent years, growing concerns
about these ties, and allegations of some
corrupt practices, have engendered a large
amount of coverage in the media and
professional journals [2–4].
In my experience, the main concerns
about close ties between companies and
doctors are that 1) they lead to inappro-
priate prescribing that can harm patients;
2) they create divided loyalties for doctors
between the health system, their patients,
and manufacturing companies, which is a
conflict of commitment as well as a conflict
of interest; 3) they lead to use of unnec-
essary and expensive medications with
consequent costs falling on health care
systems and patients; 4) they may lead to
medicalisation of human variation, i.e.,
‘‘disease-mongering’’; and 5) they diminish
the professional standing of doctors in the
eyes of the public and governments, which
leads to a reduced ability to advocate for
the health of patients, for the public, and
on behalf of the profession.
In response to community concerns,
legislators have tried to improve the
transparency of the relationships between
doctors and drug companies—for exam-
ple, the recently passed Physicians Pay-
ments Sunshine Act in the United States,
and mandatory disclosure requirements
for companies in Australia [5,6]. These
require public reporting of certain types of
industry-sponsored activities; in Australia
this includes the nature of the sponsored
meetings, the venues, any hospitality
provided, and overall costs [6].
In response to widely voiced concerns,
professional bodies around the world have
tightened their codes of conduct, and the
state of Massachusetts passed legislation
banning gifts from drug and device
manufacturers [7–9]. Drug companies
are trying to reduce some of their more
egregious activities, such as provision of
lavish gifts and entertainment, and overly
generous travel support. Recent revisions
to the Code of Practice of the Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America specif-
ically prohibit these activities [8]. Such
activities have long been the focus of those
who have questioned the relationships
between doctors and drug companies.
They have also been the main target of
the legislative responses in the US and
Australia. But, open-ended activities such
as ‘‘unrestricted’’ research grants, ‘‘educa-
tional’’ grants, membership in speakers’
bureaus and advisory panels, consultan-
cies, and stock-holding could be of greater
concern, through an insidious blurring of
professional boundaries and obligations
[10]. There is evidence that these types
of ties are common among specialist
physicians [11].
Underlying all of these concerns is a
belief that close ties between doctors and
pharmaceutical companies have been
shown to create the negative effects noted
at the start of this article. It is fair to ask
about the evidence underpinning these
beliefs. The paper by Geoffrey Spurling
and colleagues in the October 2010 issue
of PLoS Medicine addresses the question of
whether drug company information has
an impact on doctors’ prescribing [12].
This publication is timely and important.
It is a substantial update to previous
work—38 of the 58 studies that were
included did not feature in previous
reviews. Spurling and colleagues highlight
some important points. It was not possible
to obtain confident summary quantitative
estimates of the effects of industry activi-
ties, and they ended up expressing the
overall results by doing ‘‘head counts’’.
The majority of studies found either an
undesired effect on prescribing quality or
costs, or found no effect. The lack of a
quantitative summary measure is not
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This Perspective discusses the fol-
lowing study published in PLoS
Medicine:
Spurling GK, Mansfield PR, Mon-
tgomery BD, Lexchin J, Doust J,
et al. (2010) Information from Phar-
maceutical Companies and the
Quality, Quantity, and Cost of Phy-
sicians’ Prescribing: A Systematic
Review. PLoS Med 7(10): e1000352.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000352.
Geoff Spurling and colleagues re-
port findings of a systematic review
looking at the relationship between
exposure to promotional material
from pharmaceutical companies
and the quality, quantity, and cost
of prescribing. They fail to find
evidence of improvements in pre-
scribing after exposure, and find
some evidence of an association
with higher prescribing frequency,
higher costs, or lower prescribing
quality.
PLoS Medicine | www.plosmedicine.org 1 November 2010 | Volume 7 | Issue 11 | e1000359surprising, but is regrettable, as the
overview of numbers of studies rather
than their results takes no account of the
effect size, the sample size, or the quality of
individual studies. However, the authors
made an assessment of the methodological
rigor of the studies included in their
review. They concluded, not surprisingly,
that it was low. There was a heavy reliance
on cross-sectional studies and time series
analyses, which are susceptible to a range
of biases and order effects. There were
only two randomised trials, and these were
not relevant as they did not test the
interventions generally used in the field
by pharmaceutical manufacturers.
Spurling and colleagues made a solid
assessment of the methodological quality
of this literature and addressed two
additional concerns—publication bias
and outcome reporting bias. The former
is the well-known tendency for authors to
submit only positive studies for publica-
tion. Publication bias seems more com-
mon in the case of low quality non-
randomised studies, the type reviewed
here [13]. This is acknowledged by the
authors. Tests for publication bias include
funnel plot asymmetry, which requires an
estimate of effect size and precision for
each study, and is not possible with this
literature. The authors seem to argue
against their results being subject to
outcome reporting bias. This has been
identified as the tendency for studies to be
published, but for authors to report
preferentially those outcomes that
changed significantly with the intervention
[14]. The authors of this review found that
significant associations between exposure
to industry promotion and changes to
measures of prescribing were more com-
mon in studies that reported a single unit
of analyses than those that reported
multiple units of analyses. They argue
against reporting bias, but one possible
explanation of their results is that the
authors were selective about reporting
their units of analyses, being more likely
to do this when they found significant
associations.
But does any of this matter? Sometimes
we are forced to draw conclusions and
take actions even when the supporting
evidence is of a low level, as it is here.
When assessing a body of evidence for
harm we have to consider a number of
factors, including the magnitude of the
effect and the quality of the research
behind the claims. But there are other
dimensions, including the potential bene-
fits of the activities and the availability of
alternatives (in this case other sources of
information on new pharmaceutical prod-
ucts). These questions, normally applied to
treatments, may sit uncomfortably in a
political economy where private compa-
nies have the right, indeed the obligation,
to market their products effectively to
health professionals.
But if industry promotional activities
influence the treatments that patients
receive, we should ask for evidence of
benefit. If that benefit is better knowledge
and more effective and safer use of
medications, and commercial promotion
is better at doing this than publicly funded
drug information, we should be prepared
to tolerate some adverse effects. If the
benefits are slight, or absent, then we
should have a low tolerance for any
adverse effects. Spurling and colleagues
may have difficulty demonstrating a strong
evidentiary base for claims of harm from
industry promotion, but they have done
an effective job of excluding any important
benefit from this relationship [13].
So why don’t governments, all of whom
struggle with the costs of new drugs, make
greater efforts to provide unbiased pre-
scribing information to doctors? Activity is
patchy. For instance, the Australian gov-
ernment makes a modest but admirable
attempt through funding the National
Prescribing Service, and in England there
is a National Prescribing Centre (NPC)
with ‘‘NPC associates’’ in Primary Care
Trusts [15,16]. By contrast, where I live, in
Ontario, Canada, neither the national nor
the provincial government makes any
general effort to inform doctors, or to
modify prescribing practices. The phar-
maceutical industry may still hold the
medical profession in a warm embrace,
but they don’t seem to be at serious risk of
being jilted in favor of other suitors.
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